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ABSTRACT 
In a dynamic environment where context changes frequently, 
users’ privacy requirements can also change. To satisfy such 
changing requirements, there is a need for continuous analysis to 
discover new threats and possible mitigation actions. A frequently 
changing context can also blur the boundary between public and 
personal space, making it difficult for users to discover and 
mitigate emerging privacy threats. This challenge necessitates 
some degree of self-adaptive privacy management in software 
applications.  
This paper presents Caprice - a tool for enabling software 
engineers to design systems that discover and mitigate context-
sensitive privacy threats. The tool uses privacy policies, and 
associated domain and software behavioural models, to reason 
over the contexts that threaten privacy. Based on the severity of a 
discovered threat, adaptation actions are then suggested to the 
designer. We present the Caprice architecture and demonstrate, 
through an example, that the tool can enable designers to focus on 
specific privacy threats that arise from changing context and the 
plausible category of adaptation action, such as ignoring, 
preventing, reacting, and terminating interactions that threaten 
privacy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As software applications become increasingly ubiquitous and 
dynamic, users privacy requirements change and become more 
difficult to manage [2]. One class of such requirements is selective 
disclosure – deciding what information to disclose, in which 
context, and the degree of control an individual has over disclosed 
information. The pervasive nature of software applications means 
that users need to be continuously aware of new and changing 
operational context of their applications, and to understand the 
implications of disclosing personal information in new contexts. 
Also, when context changes frequently (e.g., changing time, 
location and activities) then the boundary between public and 
personal spaces can also get blurred [3] and introduce unexpected 
privacy threats. In such scenarios, users may be unaware of when 
and for what purpose sensitive information about them is being 
collected, analysed or disseminated. This makes it even more 
difficult for users to adapt their application to continue to satisfy 
their privacy requirements. 
This challenge calls for a more systematic approach to enable 
the explicit consideration of privacy in the engineering of critical 
software applications. Firstly, it is essential to continuously 
examine context changes, such as changing spatio-temporal user 
attributes, as well as the environmental or regulatory constraints 
over which such attributes are disclosed. Secondly, such 
applications should be able to reason over changing context to 
discover privacy threats, and take actions for their mitigation. 
Although there are some methods for addressing privacy at design 
time [6], they do not target privacy threats arising from changing 
context, nor the adaptation countermeasures that should be 
triggered by applications when such threats occur. 
 In this paper, we present Caprice, a tool aimed at supporting 
software engineers in the design of applications that appropriately 
adapt their behaviour to mitigate privacy threats. At design-time, 
this tool provides software engineers with some insights about the 
functional behaviour of the system under development and   
runtime context changes that can threaten privacy. The core 
features of Caprice include: (1) identifying contextual properties 
to be monitored in order to detect context changes that might 
threaten privacy; (2) reasoning over a history of agent interactions 
to discover privacy threats, and (3) suggesting possible threat 
mitigation actions based on the severity of the discovered threat. 
In this paper, we demonstrate Caprice using a mobile application 
that enables a group of runners to share running data. 
 The next section contains some background on our approach. 
Section 3 describes the Caprice system architecture, while section 
4 illustrates Caprice and its user interface by using an example 
scenario. Related work and conclusions are in sections 5 and 6, 
respectively. 
2. OUR APPROACH 
Consider a designer of a privacy critical system that has a set of 
privacy requirements to meet, and is given a set of privacy 
policies and a domain model representing the operational context 
of the designed system. One way of satisfying such privacy 
requirements in a system design is to justify that the disclosure of 
information by the system as a result of an information request, 
does not result in the violation of associated privacy policies. The 
focus of Caprice (http://caprice.codeplex.com/) is therefore to 
help designers discover possible privacy threats resulting from 
information disclosure and potential mitigation actions. 
Specifically, Caprice is meant to inform an implementation of 
adaptive privacy systems. Caprice is potentially useful for 
supporting privacy-by-design by making explicit the context of 
 
 
privacy violations and possible mitigation actions at design time. 
The underlying research upon which Caprice is based is described 
elsewhere [1]. 
The approach implemented in Caprice consists of three 
analysis steps. First we identify the set of attributes that need to be 
monitored to detect context changes that may threaten privacy. 
This is important as monitoring all attributes that characterise a 
usage context can incur performance cost.  This step is enabled 
via the notion of privacy awareness requirements – the set of 
attributes that need to be monitored to detect context changes that 
may threaten privacy. This involves the parameterisation of 
attributes in a domain model to instantiate an operational context. 
Then, by relating the system behaviour to privacy policies we 
identify a subset of attributes in the operational context to be 
monitored. 
In the second step, based on the monitored attributes, we carry 
out privacy threats analysis to discover operational context that 
can violate privacy. Caprice makes use of Barth et al.’s contextual 
integrity framework [5] to justify the preservation or violation of 
privacy in a system's behavioural model. Contextual integrity 
posits that the transfer of information about a subject from a 
sender to a receiver, in a specific context, is tied to certain 
transmission principles, such as notice, consent, and 
confidentiality. In Caprice, we operationalize these transmission 
principles by using privacy policies. Then, based on the 
behavioural representation of the system  and a domain model, we 
reason over the operational contexts that threaten privacy. The 
reasoning is an iterative process that simulates a possible 
valuation/aggregation of attributes in an operational context that 
can result in a privacy policies violation.  
For the final step, by computing the severity of a discovered 
threat, a possible adaptation action is suggested to the designer. 
The severity of a threat is computed based on a utility value 
derived from the sensitivity and obfuscation levels of the 
disclosed attribute. The sensitivity level of an attribute describes 
its importance to its owner (the subject).  The obfuscation level 
refers to the precision/accuracy of the attribute being disclosed. 
For example, the parameterised attribute age = 55 is more precise 
compared to age = 45-60. Thus, the severity of a threat will be 
lower if the sensitivity level is very low and the obfuscation level 
is inaccurate and imprecise. Conversely, threat severity will be 
higher if the obfuscation level is accurate and precise. Caprice 
suggests four categories of adaptation actions based on the 
severity of the discovered threat. These categories include Ignore, 
React, Prevent or Terminate. A user can choose to ignore a threat 
if the expected severity is low (i.e. utility value is high). 
Conversely, a higher than expected severity level might require a 
different action. In react, a user can allow the message to be 
transferred, but additional conditions need to be satisfied by the 
sender/receiver to mitigate the effects of discovered threat. 
Prevent involves a user simply objecting to the message 
transmission between the sender and the receiver. Finally, 
terminate is the action that is selected when threat severity is at 
the peak level. This involves stopping further message transfers, 
thus withdrawing from associating with the group objective.  
3. CAPRICE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
Caprice is implemented using the Microsoft .Net framework and 
its architecture consists of three layers, as shown in Figure 1. The 
modelling layer (layer 1) generates the domain, policy and 
behavioural model of the system. The domain model is 
instantiated using an interpreter from a domain knowledge 
repository. The policy model retrieves policy statements from a 
policy repository. Finally, a behavioural model is generated and 
represented as an FSM of the system. 
The second layer is composed of the operational context 
emulator, the FSM-Policy connector, and the agent interaction 
simulator. An agent here represents the sender, receiver or subject 
of transferred information. The operational context emulator 
evaluates a sequence of operational contexts based on attributes 
defined in the domain model. The FSM-Policy Connector 
overlays state transitions with privacy policies. Using the agent 
interaction simulator, Caprice can then simulate interaction 
between multiple agents. This is achieved by associating an FSM 
instance with each agent. Then a random message transfer 
involving agents is simulated using a Monte Carlo simulation 
algorithm. It is also possible for the designer to customize the 
policies associated with each FSM instance representing an agent.  
In the third layer, for every operational context simulated in 
the second layer, the designer is presented with a runtime view of 
FSM instances. This includes the possible privacy threats and 
mitigation actions that can be generated by the added operational 
context. The privacy awareness engine filters an evaluated subset 
of monitored attributes from the operational context. 
Subsequently, the privacy threats reasoner checks if the 
operational context of an agent interaction satisfies the privacy 
policies of the associated subject. It does so by first building a 
model of knowledge gained by interacting agents about the 
subject over a sequence of interactions. Based on LTL properties 
associated with the ensuing policy, the privacy threats reasoner 
then checks if the modelled knowledge will satisfy the privacy 
policies of the subject for that operational context. Finally, if the 
policies are not satisfied, the Mitigation Action Analyser 
recommends a possible mitigation action based on predefined 
adaptation rules. 
4. USING CAPRICE 
In this paper, we use a track sharing mobile application for 
runners and other outdoor activity to illustrate the usage of 
Caprice. Similar examples of such application include B.iCycle 
(http://b-icycle.com/), MyTracks (mytracks.appspot.com/) etc.  
Typically, such applications enable a group of runners to share 
live GPS tracks and performance statistics with fellow runners 
and other agents such as their fitness instructors and physicians. 
For this example, privacy management includes the capability of 
runners to decide the limits of information disclosure to other 
agents – about their current location, running time, distance, age, 
heart rate, burned calories, weight loss, etc. Effective adaptive 
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privacy requires runners to understand information flows, weigh 
the consequences of sharing information, and make informed, 
context-specific decisions to disclose or withhold information. 
 The overall workflow for using Caprice separates between 
three tasks. This includes the process of instantiating the domain 
and behavioural models with associated policy repository in order 
to identify privacy awareness requirements. The second task is 
related to discovering privacy threats. The last step involves the 
suggestion of plausible adaptation actions to mitigate the threats 
discovered. In this section, we describe how these three tasks can 
be performed in Caprice. 
4.1. Privacy Awareness Requirements  
The identification of privacy awareness requirements starts with 
identifying attributes that characterise the domain of system 
operation. This is an activity that can be carried out by a domain 
expert/system designer. The FSM of the designed system is then 
modelled by identifying the states, events, and transitions that 
define the behaviour of the system. In particular, an FSM 
description includes highlighting the domain attributes that are 
disclosed as a result of a state transition, as well as privacy 
policies that constrain defined state transitions. The set of 
attributes that need to be monitored for privacy threats analysis is 
the subset of domain attributes that are common to both the set of 
disclosed attributes resulting from a transition, and privacy policy 
that constrains that transition. 
 Domain attributes are captured by clicking the ‘add attribute’ 
button on the domain model tab of Caprice. This step also allows 
the definition of inference relations amongst attributes. An 
inference relation is a phenomenon that enables the deduction of 
previously unknown information from another disclosed attribute. 
In Caprice, this is achieved either via direct implication or 
aggregation. They both involve the use of established rules that 
predict the value of an attribute to some degree of accuracy. 
Implication inference relations are uni/bidirectional relations 
between two attributes. An example of a bidirectional implication 
inference is locationName ⇔ locationCoordinates (i.e. if a 
runner’s locationName is disclosed, it is possible to deduce the 
locationCoordinates and vice versa). Aggregation inference can 
be deduced by learning patterns that occur in the values of 
attributes over time. For example, the relation Weight ⊧   BMI ∩ 
height infers that the knowledge of a runner’s BMI and height 
may be aggregated to infer the runner’s weight. While some forms 
of aggregation relations can be bidirectional, we have only 
considered unidirectional aggregations. Generally, these 
relationships necessitate monitoring additional attributes to satisfy 
privacy awareness requirements. For example, assuming Weight is 
private for a runner, there is also a need to monitor the disclosure 
of BMI and height of the runner. Additionally, a subset of possible 
attribute values with the associated sensitivity and obfuscation 
levels are also defined.  
The functional behaviour of the system is modelled in Caprice 
using an FSM editor. An example of an FSM is shown in Figure 2 
(bottom-middle). For every event that is created, the domain 
attributes that characterise the event are identified. For example, 
the event EstablishFix enables the application to obtain an initial 
GPS fix, and the attribute that characterises this event is the 
runner’s current locationCoordinates.   Subsequently, for every 
state transition that is defined, the FSM editor enables a designer 
to select the event that triggers the transition. We envisage that not 
all states or transitions in a state machine will be involved in the 
disclosure of privacy sensitive information. In such cases, a 
designer can uncheck the affected transitions or states.  
The key assumption in associating privacy policies with state 
transitions is that the transition from one state to another is bound 
by specific transmission principles operationalized as privacy 
policies. Thus, privacy policies that are associated with attributes 
disclosed as a result of the event are automatically selected as the 
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transmission principles for that transition. As   Figure 2 (bottom-
left) shows,   privacy policies are expressed using IF-THEN-
UNLESS statements tagged with temporal constraints. These 
temporal constraints can be expressed in the past (using 
PREVIOUSLY and LAST-TIME temporal operators), in the 
future (using NEXT-TIME, HENCEFORTH, EVENTUALLY 
temporal operators), and in all states (using ALL-TIME operator). 
4.2. Privacy Threats Analysis  
Privacy threat analysis is an automated process that is triggered by 
selecting a source agent in the Caprice environment, and clicking 
the ‘play’ button. The analysis involves the discovery of different 
operational contexts (a specific set of valuations of attributes in a 
domain model – example in Figure 2 top-right) over which if a 
state transition occurs, then the associated transmission principles 
will not be satisfied. In order to achieve this, Caprice models 
users as a group of interacting social agents. These agents perform 
actions involving personal information in a given operational 
context. Each agent is represented by an FSM instance that is used 
to model its behaviour across a sequence of operational contexts. 
A state transition is then triggered when an agent interacts with 
another agent, by requesting or receiving information. Each agent 
can adjust privacy policies associated with its FSM instance based 
on specific preferences. Agents also share knowledge among their 
group members and keep memory of past interactions. In this 
way, a subject’s decision to consider a specific information 
request or response as privacy threatening is based on two factors: 
the history of operational context and what knowledge other 
agents in the group already have about the subject. We model 
such group knowledge using epistemic modal reasoning that is 
based on the S5 axiomatic system [7]. Figure 2 (top-middle) 
shows an example of simulated interactions involving 6 agents 
(B1-B6), where B4 transfers previously acquired information 
about B1 to B6. The left corner of Figure 2 shows the operational 
context that threatens privacy, as well as the information about B1 
that is transferred from B4 to B6, and the violated privacy 
policies. 
4.3. Mitigation Action Selection 
Once a privacy threat is identified, Caprice recommends a 
mitigation action based on predefined adaptation rules configured 
by the designer. These rules are based on severity and frequency 
of discovered threats. The severity of a threat is calculated using a 
utility function. Figure 2 (right) shows a suggested mitigation 
action based on the privacy threat resulting from interaction 
between B4 and B6. For this example, the age, gender and weight 
of B1 is being disclosed to B6 in a privacy threatening context. 
Subsequently, a Prevent adaption action is suggested to the 
designer in order to mitigate the inappropriately disclosed of 
information related B1. In this illustration, both sensitivity and 
obfuscation levels have the same utility weight, and the partial 
utility functions are positive and negative exponential functions 
with a damping factor of 3 and 2, respectively.  
5. RELATED WORK 
We are not aware of any similar work for engineering adaptive 
privacy. General work on inconsistency management in software 
engineering has considered so-called “repair actions” [8] to 
mitigate discovered inconsistencies. However, despite some 
similarities, it does not address privacy and its dynamic context 
sensitivity. On the other hand, Spiekermann and Cranor provided 
a framework for engineering privacy [6], but without focusing on 
the challenges brought by changing context nor on software 
engineering concerns. Our research brings these two perspectives 
together. It also differs from traditional requirements monitoring 
approaches, such as those proposed by Fickas and Feather [9], 
which do not address monitoring privacy-critical contextual 
properties. 
6. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK 
This paper has demonstrated Caprice – a tool to aid the design of 
privacy-critical systems.  The focus has been on systems whose 
intended usage is characterised by a dynamic environment where 
context changes frequently. We demonstrated a simulation 
environment in Caprice that discovers privacy threats and 
suggests plausible mitigation actions. Assuming an attribute is 
being transferred from a sending to a receiving agent (expressed 
as a transition in a state machine), Caprice reasons over what 
associated agents may know over time about the subject of their 
transmissions.. If such knowledge will violate the subject’s 
privacy policy, a mitigation action is recommended to the 
designer. These actions are based on the nature of disclosed 
information, and the frequency of occurrence of the threats. The 
demonstration highlights the plausibility of Caprice to support 
designers in making informed decisions about what privacy 
management capabilities to enable in software systems.  
Further work will focus on the semantics of the different 
categories of mitigation actions and the details of how they can be 
implemented and applied to the system. Furthermore, we have 
only considered agent interactions within a single group, future 
work will focus on extending Caprice to analyse interactions 
between multiple groups. 
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